Contrasting perspectives on China's rare earths policies: Reframing the debate through a stakeholder lens by HAYES-LABRUTO, Leslie et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
12-2013
Contrasting perspectives on China's rare earths
policies: Reframing the debate through a
stakeholder lens
Leslie HAYES-LABRUTO
Energy Futures Lab
Simon J.D. SCHILLEBEECKX
Singapore Management University, simon@smu.edu.sg
Mark WORKMAN
Energy Research Partnership
Nilay SHAH
Imperial College London
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.121
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Energy Policy Commons,
and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HAYES-LABRUTO, Leslie; Simon J.D. SCHILLEBEECKX; WORKMAN, Mark; and SHAH, Nilay. Contrasting perspectives on
China's rare earths policies: Reframing the debate through a stakeholder lens. (2013). Energy Policy. 63, 55-68. Research Collection
Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4947
Contrasting perspectives on China's rare earths policies: Reframing
the debate through a stakeholder lens
Leslie Hayes-Labruto a, Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx b,n, Mark Workman a,c, Nilay Shah d
a Imperial College London, Energy Futures Lab, United Kingdom
b Imperial College London, Business School, South Kensington Campus, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
c Energy Research Partnership, United Kingdom
d Imperial College London, Department of Chemical Engineering, United Kingdom
H I G H L I G H T S
 Very different perspectives persist regarding China's rare earth policies.
 Scarcity, substitutability and uncertainty drive the divergent perspectives.
 We compare China to a socially responsible corporation, “China Inc.”.
 China's internal stakeholders have higher salience than ROW.
 We propose and reframe policy mitigation strategies.
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a b s t r a c t
This article critically compares China's rare earth policy with perspectives upheld in the rest of the world
(ROW). We introduce rare earth elements and their importance for energy and present how China and
the ROW are framing the policy debate. We ﬁnd strongly dissonant views with regards to motives for
foreign direct investment, China's two-tiered pricing structure and its questionable innovation potential.
Using the metaphor of “China Inc.”, we compare the Chinese government to a socially responsible
corporation that aims to balance the needs of its internal stakeholders with the demands from a
resource-dependent world. We ﬁnd that China's internal stakeholders have more power and legitimacy
in the REE debate than the ROW and reconceptualise various possible mitigation strategies that could
change current international policy and market dynamics. As such, we aim to reframe the perspectives
that seem to govern the West and argue in favor of policy formation that explicitly acknowledges China's
triple bottom line ambitions and encourages the ROW to engage with China in a more nuanced manner.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of metals with unique
properties that make them indispensable in many high tech
products, in the clean technology sector and in various defense
applications (Angerer et al., 2009; Bailey Grasso, 2012; BGS, 2011;
Bruno, 2012). Given the growing economic and the persistent
strategic importance of these sectors, both in the developed and
the developing world, continuous access to these resources is both
commercially (Ad-hoc working group on deﬁning critical raw
materials, 2010; Defra, 2011b; US Department of Energy, 2011),
and strategically important for many nations (US National
Academy of Sciences, 2008; US National Research Council, 2008).
Moreover, following the expected growth in clean technologies,
the demand for rare earths is expected to rise in the near future
(Buchert, 2011; Hoenderdal, 2011). For the moment, China is the
only country that combines operational rare earth mines with the
necessary technology to mine them so that the country controls
between 95 and 97% of the rare earth market (Long et al., 2010;
Tse, 2011; USGS, 2011). China's supply dominance and exertion of
market power are worrisome to many governments and compa-
nies around the world (Bradsher, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; House of
Parliament, 2010; Vateva, 2012). Resource-dependent countries
and ﬁrms are therefore looking for different ways to engage with
China and ensure sufﬁcient and stable supply in the short and long
term (Eddy, 2012; Haxel et al., 2002; Hirokawa, 2011; Hook et al.,
2012).
In many debates and discussions, China is depicted as the
bogeyman that abuses its market power and infringes trade
agreements (Buijs and Sievers, 2012; Morrison and Tang, 2012;
Nasir, 2012; Plumer, 2011; Weslosky, 2012). However, a more
balanced approach that investigates the facts and the ﬁgures
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without all the hot air will be beneﬁcial to all stakeholders
involved (Seaman, 2010). To do so, we investigate whether China's
rare earth policy could be understood as a socially responsible
strategy that balances environmental, social and economic needs
catalyzed by stakeholders or whether it is a strictly economic,
resource-nationalist strategy driven by China's current dominance
in rare earth elements (REEs).
After sketching the components of the rare earth sector through
the lenses of the policymakers of China and the ROW, the disagree-
ment is epitomized in three distinct areas: (1) China's export strategy
characterized by quota and ‘anti-competitive’ pricing; (2) China's
alleged lack of innovative capacity; and (3) China's ambition to
attract FDI by exercising resource nationalism. To analyze this
discourse, we introduce the China Inc. metaphor using a strategic
management framework. Our analysis of stakeholder salience in
terms of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997) depicts
the ROW as a dependent stakeholder, whereas local authorities, local
civil society and the central government are found to have higher
salience. This conceptualization inspires us to develop suggestions of
how the ROW can strategically adapt to and partially overcome China
Inc.'s dominant position.
2. The issue with rare earth elements: local scarcity,
no substitutes and uncertainty
Despite their name, rare earth elements (REEs) are not really
rare (Haxel et al., 2002), but their high dispersion throughout the
earth's crust has resulted in only a handful of locations with high
enough concentrations for economically viable mining operations
(Schoolderman and Mathlene, 2011). Additionally, the mining
and production of rare earths has moved from Mountain Pass,
California, where environmental damage and production costs
were too high, (Long et al., 2010; Tse, 2011) to China, where
development has been encouraged ever since Deng Xiaoping
recognized REEs as an important strategic resource. This sparked
signiﬁcant investments in China's knowledge and technology base
(Hannon et al., 2011; Haxel et al., 2002; Hurst, 2010; Seaman,
2010), which has led to what is sometimes called “China's rare-
earth stranglehold” as shown in Fig. 1 (Plumer, 2011).
China has thus become the de facto producer, user, and exporter
of REEs (Kingsnorth, 2011), with the USA, Japan, Germany and
France as the key importers (see Fig. 2) (BGS, 2011; UN Comtrade,
2009). The problematic nature of this import-dependency is accen-
tuated by China's questionable control of corruption, regulatory
quality, political stability, voice and accountability as measured by
the worldwide governance indicators, where China ranks between
the 25th and 50th percentile, with an average of 29.7/100
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). Based on such information, nations have
started to stress the importance of diversiﬁed rare earth metal
portfolios for domestic imports.
Secondly, REEs have no known alternatives or substitutes
(Hoenderdal, 2011; Holliday et al., 2012), which in combination
with high lead times for mine development (Kidela Capital Group,
2010) and the lack of production and reﬁning capability outside of
China, reinforces the power-dependence relationship between
China and the ROW (Humphries, 2012). The appeal of REEs lies
in their unparalleled electrical, optical, magnetic, and catalytic
applications that signiﬁcantly improve energy efﬁciency and aid in
miniaturization thereby decreasing environmental impacts, which
is why they are used in many high-tech, cleantech and precision
applications as shown in Tables 1 and 2 (Angerer et al., 2009; BGS,
2011; US Department of Energy, 2011; USGS, 2011; Wouters and
Bol, 2009).
Thirdly, there is considerable uncertainty about the quantity
and location of rare earth reserves. The following ﬁgure compares
the data on anticipated REE reserves as produced by the Chinese
Society of Rare Earths and UK-based Roskill (Zhanheng, 2011) with
data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) on proven
reserves (Long et al., 2010).
While the deﬁnition of proven and anticipated reserves differs,
the various sources seem to distribute responsibility in different
ways through the use of different reserves deﬁnitions. Following
Zhanheng (2011) China holds less than 23% of global reserves and
Brazil holds almost 32.5%. Long et al. (2010) argue that China holds
about 36% of global REE reserves and attribute only 0.05% to Brazil.
Korinek and Kim (2010) discuss the reserve base for rare earths as
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Fig. 1. REE production in China and the ROW (adapted from Long et al., 2010).
Fig. 2. Major exporters and importers of REEs (adapted from UN Comtrade, 2009).
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well and state that 57.71% is to be found in China, 13.62% in FSU
and 9.1% in the USA. This suggests a varying distribution of
responsibility from the actors involved. China's data suggest that
Brazil's anticipated reserve quantities have the potential to be
exploited, thus reducing the current reliance on China. The USGS
data, on the other hand, suggests that China's proven reserve
dominance warrants their role as global provider of rare earths
(Long et al., 2010; see Fig. 3). Despite these differences, it is
unanimously agreed that China produces 95–97 percent of REEs
used in downstream end-user products. It is also generally
accepted that the deposits in China are plentiful in heavy rare
earths, and estimated to contain 80 per cent of the world's heavy
rare earth elements (BGS, 2011; Long et al., 2010; USGS, 2011).
With the relatively recent boom in the use of REEs, especially
driven by rapid development of clean technologies and high-tech
applications, REE usage is likely to increase in the future (Alonso
et al., 2012; Ayres and Talens-Peiro, forthcoming; Buchert, 2011;
Hoenderdal, 2011). This estimated demand increase for resources
with unique, hard-to-imitate-and-substitute properties can create
a sustainable competitive advantage for the resource owner
(Barney, 1991), while countries and organizations that need such
resources end up in a position of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978). This power-dependence relationship (Emerson, 1962) is
fundamental to understanding the dissonant perspectives in China
and the ROW. We now present the perspectives of the ROW and
China. We expose and oppose the different viewpoints and then
use the stakeholder framework from Mitchell et al. (1997) to
analyze the salience of China's internal and external stakeholders
Table 1
Rare earth elements: categorization and use.
Rare earths Atomic
no.
Category Commercial use
Scandium Sc 21 Heavy Stadium lights
Yttrium Y 39 Heavy Lasers, red coloring in screens
Lanthanum La 57 Light Electric car batteries, hybrid car engines
Cerium Ce 58 Light Lens polishes, auto catalyst, petroleum reﬁning
Praseodymium Pr 59 Light Magnets, searchlights, aircraft parts
Neodymium Nd 60 Light High-strength magnets, wind turbines, hybrid electrical vehicles, hard drives in laptops, headphones, petroleum reﬁning,
auto catalyst
Promethium Pm 61 Heavy Portable X-ray units
Samarium Sm 62 Light Glass, magnets
Europium Eu 63 Light CFL bulbs, red coloring in digital screens
Gadolinium Gd 64 Light Neutron radiography, magnets
Terbium Tb 65 Heavy High-strength magnets (permanent magnets)
Dysprosium Dy 66 Heavy High-strength magnets (permanent magnets)
Holmium Ho 67 Heavy Glass tint coloring, lasers
Erbium Er 68 Heavy Metal alloys
Thulium Tm 69 Heavy Lasers, medical X-ray units
Ytterbium Yb 70 Heavy Stainless steel alloys
Lutetium Lu 71 Heavy Catalyst in petroleum reﬁning
Table 2
Industry-speciﬁc rare earths.
Rare earth
products
REEs Clean Tech Usage Speciﬁc applications
Magnets Nd, Pr, Tb, Dy Samarium–cobalt magnets, neodymium–iron–boron magnets (2.5 times greater
magnetic energy than samarium–cobalt), size reduction (neodymium use in
speakers, earphones, MP3 players), hard disks, DVD drives
Motors, disc drives, MRI, power generation, wind
turbines, microphones, speaker, magnetic
refrigeration
Metallurgy La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Y NiMH batteries, fuel cells, Steel, Lighter ﬂints,
super alloys, aluminum magnets
Phosphors Eu, Y, Tb, Nd,
Er, Gd, Ce
LCD displays, ﬂuorescent lighting, medical
imaging, lasers, ﬁber optics
Glass and
polishing
Ce, La, Pr, Nd,
Gd, Er, Ho
Polishing compounds, colourisers, UV resistant
glass, X-ray imaging
Catalysts La, Ce, Pr, Nd Increase effectiveness, enable reactions to run at high temperatures, reduce the
amount of platinum required (reducing costs), ﬂuid cracking for reﬁning crude oil
Petroleum reﬁning, catalytic converts, diesel
additives, chemical processing, industrial pollution
scrubbers
Ceramics La, Ce, Pr, Nd,
Y, Eu, Gd, Lu,
Dy
Capacitors, sensors, colorants, scintillators,
refractories
Nuclear/
Defense/
Water
treatment
Eu, Gd, Ce, Y,
Sm, Er, Nd, Dy
Water treatment, pigments, fertilisers
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Fig. 3. Differing deﬁnitions of rare earth reserves.
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on the dimensions of power, legitimacy and urgency, which opens
avenues to reframe to existing debates.
3. The ROW perspective
Numerous documents have been produced by governmental
agencies in the ROW that discuss resource availability (BMWi,
2010; COM, 2008, 2011; Defra, 2011a, 2011b; Haxel et al., 2002;
Long et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2007; UNEP, 2011; US Department
of Energy, 2011; USGS, 2011). Additionally, resource availability has
been presented as a critical issue for companies by consultancies
and associations, which exhibits its importance not only on a
governmental level but also at the corporate one (EEF, 2012; Ernst
& Young, 2011; Schoolderman and Mathlene, 2011). Schillebeeckx
and George (forthcoming) have argued that governments engage
in shaping, stabilizing and bridging of the resource space; through
policy initiatives, lawsuits before the WTO, establishing partner-
ships with other resource rich countries, setting up platforms of
cooperation, promoting innovation and R&D, providing ﬁnancial
incentives for new mine development, stockpiling and other
activities, different governments aim to ease their dependence
on the supply of scarce or critical minerals such as REEs. A recent
publication from Polinares, a European think-tank on natural
resource policy, provides a useful overview of the three key
worries of the ROW (Buijs and Sievers, 2012).
Firstly, China has shown its ability and willingness to use its
control of the REE market for political purposes. Although Beijing
never admitted to any involvement, it is broadly believed that
China strategically withheld deliveries of REEs to Japan when a
Chinese ﬁsherman was detained by Japanese authorities for ﬁsh-
ing in waters that have long been a source of dispute over
ownership between the two countries (Bradsher, 2010b). Follow-
ing this action, exports to the US and the EU were delayed,
ofﬁcially for tighter inspections (Bradsher, 2010c). While the
delays and the underlying motives remain disputed, the perspec-
tive in the American press was clear: “if true, it is only the latest in
a series of provocative measures” (Horn, 2010). Damien Ma1
provided another perspective: “My concern is that there are many
folks across interest groups who dearly want to believe that this
“sanction” narrative is true, not so much to promote US industrial
policy (which I think is a good idea), but to just punish China as
the solution. That is the real risk to me of [this] narrative” (in
Madrigal, 2010). Chinese academics like Yufan Hao and Jane
Nakano have furthermore stressed that China would not use rare
earths as a weapon and that the delay in rare earth shipments that
caused international outcry had probably more to do with internal
bureaucracy than anything else (in Webster, 2011).
Secondly, it is often argued that the export restrictions imposed
by China, create and “unfair competitive advantage” (Buijs and
Sievers, 2012) as local Chinese producers beneﬁt from lower
prices. Although price information is not readily available because
REE contracts are generally negotiated rather than traded on spot
or future markets, there is strong evidence that price differences
between the Chinese market and the ROW are indeed signiﬁcant
(Table 3). The exact duration of such contracts is mostly kept quiet
but a preference for ‘long-term’ seems to exist (e.g. Salzman, 2012;
Swanepoel, 2011). Furthermore, since 2006, China has reduced
exports by 6% annually. When China further reduced their export
quota in the second half of 2010, despite heavy protests in the
ROW, price spikes of up to 850% occurred in the market
(Humphries, 2012; Looney, 2011). More structurally, Lynas Cor-
poration publishes the daily prices for speciﬁc rare earths, which
shows that between 2009 and 2011, average prices have increased
by factors of 5.7 to 12.4 in China and between 5.7 and 30.4 in the
ROW. Although Chinese prices are indeed lower, it is interesting to
see that the relative price increases for neodymium, praseody-
mium, dysprosium, europium and terbium oxides are almost
identical for both China and the ROW, while the difference in
relative price increase for samarium (5.26), cerium (2.86) and
lanthanum (4.01) oxides are very pronounced (Lynas Corporation,
2012).
Thirdly, China's de facto monopoly position and the creation of
price differences is often interpreted “as an attempt to capture
more rents along the value chain” because companies that require
REE inputs are forced to move their operations to China to “beneﬁt
from a steady and affordable supply of rare earths” (Buijs and
Sievers, 2012). This outcome has been conﬁrmed by the vice
chairman of Inner Mongolia Zhao Shuanglian: “To use moderation
in the control of the production of rare earth resources and reduce
exports to an acceptable level is to attract more Chinese and
foreign investors into the region” (Bradsher, 2010a). While this
statement exposes a correlation between the Chinese policy and
the attraction of investment, it leaves open the question whether
this outcome is also the overarching goal of the existing policies;
two things that are often confused in popular and policy debates.
These three arguments appear characteristic of resource
nationalism and echo concerns about energy security following
the Arab oil embargo in 1974 (e.g. Okita, 1974; Park et al., 1976).
While there is considerable evidence that such embargoes gen-
erally hurt the country imposing the embargo through the enact-
ment of counter-strategies (Buijs and Sievers, 2012), and that such
self-imposed export constraints run counter to a purely economic
logic, the ROW perspective seems to focus on arguments rooted in
economic self-interest (price differences leading to competitive
advantage and attracting FDI) and Chinese power plays. In a
particularly critical article, Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman
called China a “rogue economic superpower”, and an unreliable
regime “willing to wage economic warfare on the slightest
provocation” (Krugman, 2010). But, there are two sides to every
coin and in order to provide a full understanding of the REE
debate, we turn our attention to China's perspective.
4. China's perspective
The Chinese perspective is not one of resource nationalism but
one of domestic demand, environmental worries, social upheaval,
illegal mining, smuggling, and abiding by international trade
regulation (Hao and Liu, 2011). Following the Chinese ‘Information
Ofﬁce of the State Council’ (IOSC), this will entail increasing the
industrial scale of rare earth processing, restructuring pricing
Table 3
Price increase for selected REE and the difference between China and ROW
Lynas (Corporation, 2012).
2009–2011 Average price increase Price increase difference
REE oxide (FOB price) ROW China
Lanthanum oxide 2133.20% 531.37% 401.45%
Cerium oxide 2628.87% 919.25% 285.98%
Neodymium oxide 1225.94% 1132.59% 108.24%
Praseodymium oxide 1094.29% 919.16% 119.05%
Samarium oxide 3041.18% 578.05% 526.11%
Dysprosium oxide 1253.39% 1239.19% 101.15%
Europium oxide 576.75% 575.69% 100.18%
Terbium oxide 645.39% 629.66% 102.50%
1 Damien Ma is a Fellow at The Paulson Institute, focused on investment and
policy programs and the Institute's research and think tank activities. Previously, he
was a lead analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk research and advisory ﬁrm,
specializing in China.
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ladders to more accurately reﬂect the cost of rare earths and
working towards developing more REE-based end-products. At the
same time China seeks to increase control of disorderly mineral
exploitation, limit excessive mining and monitor and invest in
cleaning up environmental damages (IOSC, 2012). The main REE
policy initiative undertaken by China's premier Wen Jiabao is the
commitment to consolidate the entire rare earth industry into
three regional state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This would result
in a division of the Chinese industry into three districts: North
(Inner Mongolia and Shandong), South (Jiangxi, Guangdong,
Fujian, Hunan, and Guangxi), and West (Sichuan).
The restructuring of the mining regions has multiple advan-
tages; politically, it would facilitate decision-making and enforce-
ment processes around production, control of export quotas, and
pricing of rare earth oxides (Hurst, 2010). Environmentally, the
consolidation exercise is meant to improve the sustainability of
mining and reﬁning. Socially, it would facilitate the acknowl-
edgment of health-related problems caused by the abuse of toxic
chemicals. Economically, the business rationale behind the con-
solidation is to attract investment, expand downstream services,
increase tax income and avoid unnecessary competition –
amongst other by illegal mining – and accompanying ﬁnancial
losses (Tse, 2011). These triple bottom line targets are heavily
intertwined and consistent with China's general development
strategy that includes reducing its carbon intensity, stimulating
low carbon technologies, and increasing its GDP per unit of energy
used (Hannon et al., 2011). More speciﬁcally, the IOSC has stated
formally: “The state encourages enterprises to strengthen innova-
tion in management, establish the modern enterprise system, and
accelerate industrial upgrading, in order to transform them into
modern enterprises that save resources, protect the environment,
follow the path of intensive development and actively fulﬁll their
social responsibilities” (2012). We discuss the economic, environ-
mental and social rationales separately before we move on to
expose the differences between the clashing perspectives expli-
citly. Table 4 summarizes China's triple bottom line (Elkington,
1997) and links the situation in the recent past to the actions the
government is taking to overcome the existing problems.
4.1. The economic rationale
China's Ministry of Industry and Trade prohibited all new
mining licenses until at least July 2011 and banned all new rare
earth separation projects until at least 2015 (Tse, 2011; Vateva,
2012). Though such measures may seem draconic, eliminating
illegal mining is fundamental to increasing control over prices and
to decreasing environmental damage (Seaman, 2010; Vateva,
2012). Despite local governments focusing their resources on the
crackdown, illegal mining persists and the Chinese government
has not mapped out speciﬁc punishments to target illegal REE
miners. Local law ofﬁcials can only punish illegal miners on
grounds of forest and natural resource damage, which currently
stands as a $1.6 (10 Yuan) ﬁne for every square meter of forest
damaged (Xinhua, 2011).2 The new policy framework however
offers some progress as it allows rewards of up to 3,000 Yuan for
informants. This increased the effectiveness of controls, resulting
in the closures of 23 illegal mines and 57 processing ponds by
April 2012 (Yoshioka, 2012). China's synchronised crackdown on
illegal mining has been applied to a number of mining operations
across the nation, not just rare earths, driven by the same desire to
rid the countryside of unsafe and careless mining practices (Jingxi,
2012; Xinhua, 2012). In 2006, 47 domestic REE producers and
traders were authorized to export REE products; by 2011, this
number had decreased to 22 authorized REE producers following
the implementation of China's “Rare-Earth Industry Development
Plan of 2009–2015” (Hurst, 2010). Stopping illegal mining (and
illegal exports) has clear economic implications. An unofﬁcial
government source stated that about 20,000 t of REEs were
smuggled out of the country in 2008, which equates to roughly
50% of legal exports of 39,500 t that year (Xinhua, 2009). Japan is
estimated to be one of the benefactors of this illegal trade,
obtaining 20 per cent of its rare earth needs from the Chinese
black market (Hurst, 2010).
By restricting the exports of rare earths and using a two-tier
pricing structure, China is using a trade scheme that encourages
manufacturers to move production to China. If production is
moved to China, companies capitalize on the opportunity to
sidestep the export quota system as the quota only refer to the
exportation of raw materials: companies are exempt when export-
ing ﬁnished goods (Nasir, 2012). The ambition to attract companies
from both home and abroad has been conﬁrmed by Inner
Mongolia's vice-chairman Zhao Shuanglian (in Dingding, 2009).
While the ROW sees the desire to attract FDI as the dominant
motive for the export taxes and quotas, it is valuable to understand
China's rationale for these limitations to free trade. From China's
vantage point, there is poor sagacity in importing end products
fabricated from its own exported raw rare earths. The value of rare
earths increases over 1000% from REE in its ore compared to its
reﬁned state as a metal, as shown in Fig. 4 (Sykes, 2012). A primary
mechanism in overcoming the Dutch disease3 is indeed to attract
investors in the rare earth processing sector from around the
Table 4
China's REE policies.
China Past situation Actions and plans
Economic 1. Illegal mining and 47 licensed REE producers
2. Wasteful competition with negative externalities
3. Cheap prices for REEs
1. Close down and consolidate into 3 SOEsþNew policies
2. Increase centralized control over pricing and incorporate externalities
3. Export taxesþAttract investment
Social 1. Human health
2. Social unrest
3. Organized crime
4. Meet own demand
1. Deal with pollution
2. Control, allow and enforce
3. Increase penalties
4. Ensure local supply (quota)
Environmental 1. Water Pollution
2. Farmland deterioration
3. Overexploitation of resources
4. Climate change
1. Cut (illegal) production
2. Cut (illegal) production
3. Cut Production and export quota
4. Reduce carbon intensity
2 Xinhua is China's ofﬁcial news agency.
3 Economic term coined in 1977 in The Economist to describe the ostensible
relationship between the increase of mineral or resource exploitation and the
corresponding decline in manufacturing.
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world (Bin, 2011). To date, $960 million has been invested from
enterprises in the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and
Canada into the rare earth industry, indicating the strategy has
had the desired effect (IOSC, 2012).
4.2. The environmental rationale
According to Zhang Peichen4 “China's rare earth output cannot
be raised fast enough to meet the entire world’s needs, as there are
environmental factors to be taken into consideration with an
increase in rare earth production” (in Bradsher, 2010a). Generally,
the most signiﬁcant environmental impact from REE mines is
uncontrolled radioactive elements found in most ores from which
REEs are extracted (e.g. Bell, 2012). It is estimated that one tonne
of REE can produce 60,000 m3 of waste gas that contains hydro-
ﬂuoric acid, 200 m3 of acid-containing sewage water, and 1–1.4 t
of radioactive waste (Jiabao and Jie, 2009; Kanazawa and Kamitani,
2006; Paul and Campbell, 2011). Additionally, reagents, injected
into the ground to extract the REEs from clay ions, contaminate
water supplies, making it unsuitable for drinking or irrigation (Gao
and Zhou, 2011). This water pollution caused by leakage of
chemicals poses a serious threat to China's ecology as much of
the mining in Baotou occurs adjacent to the Yellow River, the
primary source of irrigation and ﬁshing for 150 million down-
stream users (Hurst, 2010). Toxicity from chemicals used in
processing facilities in China has also caused measureable
amounts of disease, occupational poisoning, and farmland
destruction in and around Baotou (Gao and Zhou, 2011). Beyond
the clear environmental problems, the World Bank (2007)
reported that the cost of environmental degradation in China
would rise from 3 to 5% of national GDP in 2003 to 9% in 2012, a
tremendous ﬁgure that provides strong support for environmental
regulation in China. China has responded to these environmental
challenges by cutting down on mining (93,800 t quota in 2011),
and smelting, separation, and production (90,400 t), and by
enforcing environmental legislation. These quotas, the economic
downturn and the increased costs of environmental protection
resulted in two-thirds of the rare earth producers being shut down
or having to cut production drastically (Hongpo, 2012).
Although the environmental case is clear, the ROW has a strong
incentive to downplay any environmental motivations China
might utter. As stated by Alan Wolff5 when talking about the rare
earth WTO case: “A panel would sympathize with a genuine
environmental objective…”. But I do not think it would sym-
pathize with cutting off supply disproportionately to foreign users
in the name of saving the environment” (in Bradsher, 2010a).
While the WTO case is still pending, it is important to remember
that there is broad agreement that lax regulation on China's
production is a key driver in China's ability to keep REEs' costs
low (Seaman, 2010) and that Mountain Pass in California was
closed due to environmental concerns and uncompetitive prices
(Juetten, 2011).
4.3. The social rationale
China has clear social and health-related motives to curb REE
exploitation. The high incidence of black lung or pneumoconiosis
in Boatou, with 5387 residents suffering from the condition, is
directly tied to the 8.5 kg of ﬂuorine (a toxic gas) and 13 kg of dust
that are generated per produced tonne of rare earth (Hurst, 2010).
Occupational poisoning from lead, mercury, benzene, and phos-
phorous also plagues the region (Jiabao and Jie, 2009). These
health and safety risks are inﬂuencing the relationship between
Baotou and Beijing, which has never been one of solidarity and
strength (Truscott, 2011). The health risks are exacerbated by the
Baotou Steel Corporation, the 5th largest steel producer in China,
which sees REEs as an economically irrelevant set of by-products
due to their small market size ($3–4 billion) compared to the
market size of their primary ore, iron, valued at $962 billion (Ernst
& Young, 2011, 2012). As a result, a pool of 170 million tons of rare
earth and other by-products lies dormant in standing water while
villages downstream are forced to relocate as high traces of these
elements appear in drinking water, found as far downstream as
the Yellow River (Bin, 2011; IOSC, 2012). On a broader scale, there
are estimated to be more than 450 ‘cancer villages’ in China (Lee,
2010). Furthermore, since the 2007 World Bank's report stated
that around 750,000 Chinese die every year due to coal-energy
related pollution, the government has begun to realize that China's
rapid industrialization and growth are “a serious obstacle to
social and economic development” (Environmental minister Zhou
Shengxian in Wade, 2011).
In their detailed analysis of social unrest in China, (Gobel and
Ong, 2012) argue that the spectacular rise in social upheaval
(180,000–230,000 public protests in 2010) is chieﬂy triggered by
land disputes, environmental degradation and labor conﬂicts. For
instance, in July 2012, rural workers protested against the mass
amounts of environmental pollution in Sichuan, where heavy rare
earths are mined, which lead to the ultimate cancellation of the
proposed metal reﬁnery plant in the city (Hook, 2012). Beyond this
single example of increasing power of the local civil society, the
spread of protests and riots is increasingly endangering the
Communist party's ambition to balance social harmony with
economic growth. The number of complaints to the environmental
authority has increased 30% per year since 2002, while the
number of mass protests over environmental issues has grown
annually by 29% (Jun, 2007). Given rare earths' taxing toll on the
public's health and environment and the riotous consequences,
the government's consolidation and “cleaning up” of this sector to
secure a broader success for their economic development strategy
seems reasonable.
4.4. Comparing the perspectives
China's boardroom conversations regarding its rare earth
strategy do not align with policy debates elsewhere. Whatever
China contends in its Situations and Policy on Rare Earths, members
of Congress in the US contend that China's export restraints are
solely to beneﬁt China's domestic downstream industry, to force
the relocation of companies to China, and to exercise monopolistic
power over elements that are critical to the ROW's defense and
commercial industries (Morrison and Tang, 2012). These perspec-
tives “may result from deeply engrained mistrust toward China”
(Hao and Liu, 2011). Such mistrust could indeed explain why very
little recognition is given in the policy debates to seemingly
reasonable environmental and social concerns of the Communist
Party. While the ROW's silence on these matters is informative in
itself, our ambition is to delve into the dissonant arguments
expressed by the protagonists. The ROW's focal argument seems
to be that China disproportionally attracts foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) to overcome resource dependence. Export quotas and
price differences between domestic and international markets are
perceived as proof that China abuses its natural resource advan-
tage. Additionally, an old perception persists that China lacks
innovative capacity and is merely a country of imitation (Naisbitt
and Naisbitt, 2010). This innovation deﬁcit is understood as an
underlying driver of its desire to use export taxes as protectionist
4 Zhang Peichen is the deputy director of the government-backed Baotou
Research Institute of Rare Earths, the main REE research group for the Chinese
industry.
5 Former American trade ofﬁcial and current head of Dewey and Leboeuff
international trade law.
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measures. However, this argumentation is countered by China. As
said by a spokesman of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
“I don’t see any link between China's reasonable rare earth export
control policy and the irrational U.S. decision of protectionist
nature to investigate China's clean energy industries” (in
Bradsher, 2010c). To analyze these claims we discuss the price
evolution of rare earths, uncover China's innovation potential and
seek explanations for the high prevalence of China-oriented FDI.
4.5. A history of prices
“In the beginning of the 1980s, we sold REE at the price of salt. But
they deserve the price of gold. We are just starting to protect our
natural interests”.
(Wen Jiabao in Roland Berger, 2012)
A heated issue across parties is China's two-tiered pricing
structure for rare earths. Domestic REE prices are below interna-
tional prices, which the ROW argues is a crucial reason why China
attracts foreign manufacturers. China, on the other hand, contends
that this tiered pricing is not chieﬂy used to create price distor-
tions or as a mechanism to draw in companies. Table 3 shows that
the REE price increases between 2009 and 2011 had been less
steep in China than in the ROW, which lends support to the ROW's
case. Furthermore, various export duties are effectively imposed
on rare earths leaving China,6 so that price differences could
indeed incentivize companies to relocate to China (Global Trade
Alert, 2011). This is accentuated by the sharp decline in REE
exports despite relatively stable production within China (Chan
and Lan, 2011).
However, a historical argument sheds a somewhat different
light on this matter. Prices for REEs declined from the late 1950s to
the 1970s with an increased supply from Mountain Pass. Prices
rose during the late 1970s due to inﬂation, rising energy costs, and
increased demand and stabilised in the 1980s (BGS, 2011; Hedrick,
1997). When Chinese mines came into full force in the 1990s,
supply quickly outstripped demand, driving prices down signiﬁ-
cantly. The growing demand for neodymium–iron–boron (NdFeB)
magnets in the 2000s led to higher REE production in China. Over-
production of all REEs resulted, because speciﬁc REEs cannot be
mined individually. This hitchhiker characteristic of some natural
resources explains why supply and demand do not reach a simple
equilibrium and challenge the notion of linear supply curves with
responsive elasticities (Ayres and Talens-Peiro, forthcoming). Fol-
lowing the 2008 global recession, prices dropped and industries
looked towards their existing inventories to decrease production
costs. Prices for elements such as terbium fell by 50% from $720
per kilogram in 2008 to $360 per kilogram by 2009 (Bradsher,
2011b; Metal Pages, 2012). Prices increased in 2010 and 2011
driven by increased Japanese permanent magnet demand for
hybrid EVs, by the cut in Chinese exports (Humphries, 2012;
Looney, 2011; Watts, 2011) and because political and resource-
speciﬁc barriers have made re-entering the market very difﬁcult
(Korinek and Kim, 2010). By the end of 2011, price volatility
returned as the Chinese government imposed stricter regulations
in the southern provinces, slowing down heavy REE supply (Metal
Pages, 2012) (see Fig. 5).
Moreover, there is a clear economic case for price discrimina-
tion between the ROW and China. Following Aidt (1998), the
internalization of externalities combines the Coasian rationale in
which various parties mobilize to advance their interests, with the
Pigouvian tradition of a self-interested policymaker whose coer-
cive power enables him to enforce environmental legislation and
taxation. The need for government interference is transparent in
the market failure, which leads to a gap between the private and
the social/ecological optimum level of production (Lankoski and
Ollikainen, 2003). Effective policy then ensures that the marginal
abatement costs to offset the environmental damage equal the
marginal external costs (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009). From
China's perspective, we have shown that externalities consist of
local pollution that threatens the health of its people and other
environmental damage. Given that China bears the (sustainability)
costs of its REE production, it does not seem unreasonable to
expect REE importers to pay a surplus economic charge. Such an
argument has been advocated by Kox (1991) in his call for
commodity agreements with third world commodity producers
that include a price mark-up, in the form of an income tax,
for environmental preservation. As argued in the famous Brundt-
land report, although developed countries have generally been
successful in internalizing the costs of environmental damage in
the export prices, “in the case of exports from developing
countries, such costs continue to be borne entirely domestically,
largely in the form of damage costs to human health, property, and
ecosystems” (Brundtland and WCED, 1987). If the polluter is
expected to pay, should not the importer of polluting goods pay
as well?
4.6. Innovation potential
ROW governments and companies often argue that China has
very little innovation capacity due to its controlling, centralized
government. Additionally, China is increasingly being accused of
violating intellectual property (IP) rights. US Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner stated that China is “very, very aggressive, in
stealing US technology”, thereby voicing a common sentiment
Fig. 4. REE value and purity (Sykes, 2012).
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Pages, 2012). The most likely candidate is the Innovation Metal Corporation's two
North American separation plants which are still in the nascent feasibility stages
(Wong, 2012).
6 China designated a 25% export tariff on the following REEs: neodymium,
yttrium, europium, dysprosium, terbium, and scandium. The remaining 11 rare
earth elements face an export tariff of 15% and speciﬁc alloys, such as neodymium
and dysprosium alloys, face 20% tariffs.
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amongst US ofﬁcials and executives (Younglai and Martine, 2011).
Some contend that China's patent quota is driving China to steal IP
in order to produce the required patent quantities with little
regard for quality (Looney, 2011). Consequentially, China is labeled
a nation with lackluster innovation capacity that can only regur-
gitate cheap and low-quality versions of goods.
While this might be true for some industries, the rare earth
industry is not one of them. China controls 97 per cent of
operations and has been improving its innovation capacity for
each step in the REE production process since the 1980s. As a
result, China has developed a world-leading REE knowledge base.
Given that there is signiﬁcant proof that network structures of
organizations—such as those within the SOEs—foster learning,
provide economic beneﬁts, and facilitate the management of
resource dependencies (Podolny and Page, 1998), REE knowledge
networks can be expected to have a magnetic effect on companies.
China's dominance is exempliﬁed in the fact that even new mines
coming online in the ROW will need to send their raw rare earths
to China to be separated until a separation facility is developed
elsewhere.7 The cost of current separation facilities outside of
China is approximately $800 million, which boils down to a
separation cost of $40,000 per tonne per annum of throughput,
excluding costs of labor and of required acids (Worstall, 2012). The
key to the economic feasibility for new mines attempting to come
online in the next 5–10 years will be to achieve low-cost separa-
tion techniques, which China has been perfecting since it took
control of the REE mining sector in the late 1980s.
In 1990, rare earths received roughly 18,000 hits within the
American Chemical Society database. That number jumped to
1 million in 2007, indicative of the growing interest in the ﬁeld
(Adachi et al., 2010). The importance of rare earths research has
been increasing over the last few decades, with the foundation of
“The Journal of Rare Earths” in 2006 by the Chinese Society of Rare
Earth (CSRE) as an important step forward (CSRE, 2012).
An analysis of research into rare earths by country sheds light on
who holds the primary knowledge base, and hence the upper
hand, in the best mining and manufacturing practices in rare
earths. Thanks to China's increased investments in research fund-
ing as well as the opening of various state laboratories, the
quantity and quality of China's research has dramatically increased
(Hurst, 2010). Speciﬁcally, China has conducted more research
and published more papers on separation—the most costly part of
rare earth mining and processing—than Japan and the USA
together (Adachi et al., 2010). China has also conducted signiﬁcant
research on REE-related pollution. China lacks, however, in
research articles on innovative new processes for rare earth
extraction where Japan leads (Adachi et al., 2010). Regardless,
China currently stands at the epicenter of research knowledge in
the sphere. The ‘Journal of Rare Earths’ contains a special column
“bibliography of science and technology of rare earths published in
China” (CSRE, 2012), emblematic of the dominance of Chinese
knowledge concerning these metals. Beyond publications, China
developed a dominant position (28% market share) in the global
wind turbine market and the fabrication of NdFeB permanent
magnets, as shown in Fig. 6 (GWEC, 2011; Hoenderdal, 2011;
Mackowski, 2012). Therefore, China's incentive to draw in foreign
knowledge for REE development in the wind sector is low. China
already manufactures 75–80 per cent of NdFeB magnets used in
the world (Chan and Lan, 2011). Moreover, in spite of easy access
to neodymium and dysprosium needed for direct drive magnets
used in wind turbines, Chinese wind turbine manufacturers are
leading exploration into rare earth free designs via electrically
excited permanent generators (Patton, 2011). Additionally, the
country has previously proven its ability to innovate in low-
carbon wind technology (Lewis, 2007).
When it comes to rare earths, there is thus considerable
evidence that suggests that China does possess signiﬁcant inno-
vative capacity. Hence, companies might be drawn to China not
merely because of easy access to natural resources but also
because of easy access to essential knowledge.
4.7. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Various US and Japanese companies are extending their factory
capacity in China rather than elsewhere, explicitly motivated by
easy access to speciﬁc REEs, and do so despite worries about trade
secret theft (Bradsher, 2011a). Access to resources is thus a driver
for corporate relocation, but there is more to the story. Despite
government ofﬁcials identifying new energy vehicles as one of
seven strategic emerging industries that together should contri-
bute to 15% of GDP by 2020 (Lindsay, 2012), China's innovation
capacity in hybrid EVs and NiMH batteries has been relatively
weak. ROW companies like General Motors, Honda, Ford, Saturn,
and Toyota are still leading in this ﬁeld, which is a strong driver for
investments in lithium-ion technologies that require little or no
REEs (e.g. Currie, 2012). Nonetheless, companies are still relocating
to China. Although China holds the world's largest automobile
market with 14 million sales in 2009 and is ramping up its
production capacity (36.1% growth between 2009 and 2010), car
ownership per capita is still signiﬁcantly lower than in developed
nations at 4.78% versus 40% (APCO, 2010), and the uptake for EVs
in China has not yet matured due to elevated costs, lack of
charging infrastructure and scarcity of car models (Arenas
Guerrero et al., 2010; Krieger et al., 2012). The potential size of
the market, the government's support, the strong local supply
chain, the knowledge embedded in SOEs, and the permission to
run ‘trial and error’ tests in the marketplace for EVs attracts
companies such as General Motors to form joint ventures with
Chinese ﬁrms (APCO, 2010; Krieger et al., 2012; Orr and Roth,
2012). Thus, while it is clear that China attracts much FDI, the
reasons for this go beyond stable and affordable REE access. An
interesting question becomes why these rational and economic
corporate choices become so politicized. Californian Silicon Valley
is outcompeting Boston-based Route 128 because of its sustained
technological dynamism (Saxenian, 1991, 1996). The region has
consistently maintained a leading edge in information and com-
munication technology (ICT) through its ability to foster ground-
breaking entrepreneurial ventures, often tied to the human
capital embedded in Stanford University (Lee et al., 2000). The
important role of academic research and entrepreneurial activity
in the creation of innovative regions has been found in other
regions as well (Etzkowitz and Klofsten, 2005). There is very little
opposition to the magnetic effect of human capital, tied to regions
such as Silicon Valley. While similar human capital and knowledge
regarding REEs exists in China, the political perspective held by
the ROW seems to be one reminiscent of resource nationalism.
This belief is exempliﬁed in former presidential candidate Mitt
Romney's comparison between the REE crisis and the oil crisis
(Weslosky, 2012). However, while Saudi Arabia's oil embargo in
the early 70s is indeed the prototypical case of resource nation-
alism, it differs substantially from the Chinese example. Saudi
Arabia was militaristically completely dependent on the USA,
lacked the technology to extract, process and exploit its natural
resource base, and did not have an appealing market (Bruno,
2012). China's evolution into a manufacturing powerhouse has
7 Prices in this ﬁgure are real prices, corrected with the Producer Price Index
for Crude Materials for future processing. Monthly data were obtained from the
Federal Reserve, 2012. Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for further processing,
in: Data, F.R.E. (Ed.). Federal Bank of Saint Louis, St Louis. and averaged on a yearly
(quarterly) basis for 2002–2011 (2012). The base year was put at 2002, adapted
from the original data with base year 1982.
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been going on for various decades, as exempliﬁed by Fig. 7 (data
taken from WITS, 2010). China's exports clearly evolved from
largely primary products and chemicals to manufactured goods.
Speciﬁcally focusing on rare earths, China's domestic ‘consump-
tion’ of these resources exceeds the consumption of the entire
ROW (Kingsnorth, 2011).
We have brought forward dissonant perspectives regarding
China's actions on the rare earth front. The ROW's arguments echo
resource nationalism, forget the importance of China's knowledge
networks, and omit China's growing market and its supportive
internal governmental policies. Moreover, the ROW is notably
quiet about the environmental and social motivations of cutting
production and exports and differentiating between domestic and
international prices. We have found many of these arguments to
be unfounded. In the introduction, we hypothesized that China's
policies could be interpreted as strategies of a socially responsible
organization. How then should the ROW reframe its perspective to
better shape, stabilize and bridge the REE space?
5. Discussion: the REE debate through a stakeholder lens
We discussed the perspectives of China and the ROW with
regards to China's REE policies and have brought forward their
explicit differences. In this discussion section, we reframe the
debate through contrasting stakeholder lenses and characterize
the importance of China's different stakeholders along the dimen-
sions of power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997).
While this framework is typically used for the analysis of corpora-
tions and is connected with the literature on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 1991; Elkington, 1997; Freeman,
1984), we believe it can be meaningfully applied to “China Inc.”
for four reasons. Firstly, we believe the strong hierarchical govern-
ment structure, the absence of democratic voting, the ease of
transferring ownership rights from one to another entity, and the
professional management of resources, are more indicative of a
typical corporation than of a typical (Western) government.
Secondly, we are not the ﬁrst ones to compare the elements of
China to a corporation. Naisbitt and Naisbitt (2010) for instance
associate Deng Xiaoping's role during the Cultural Revolution with
that of a CEO's role in turning around a “rundown enterprise into a
healthy, proﬁtable, sustainable company”. Thirdly, because the
duties of the state befall on China Inc. as well, the ‘corporation’
is meant to behave socially responsible, so it makes sense to use a
CSR-related framework. Finally, and most importantly, we are
convinced that conceptualizing the debate along the three focal
dimensions of power, legitimacy and urgency has the potential to
challenge dominant Western perspectives and steer the debate
towards a more constructive engagement with China. We look at
the ROW as external stakeholder of China Inc., and three internal
stakeholders: (1) Beijing as the central government or the ‘board of
directors’; (2) local authorities in REE rich regions that govern the
mining process or the ‘regional managers’ and (3) the people in
the affected regions or the ‘local community/civil society’. While
understanding the ROW as a single stakeholder with uniﬁed
interests is clearly a simpliﬁcation as many different countries
face speciﬁc issues, our focus here is on the commonalities faced
by the ROW. Table 5 presents an overview of the focal stakeholders
of China Inc.
Power and dependence in the stakeholder theory relate to the
(in)ability to affect or be affected by the achievement of another
organization's objectives (Freeman, 1984). In the REE context, it is
clear that the ROW is affected by China Inc.’s social, environmental
and economic objectives. Power is typically wielded by those who
control resources (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) but
only those organizations who know how to manage the resources
they control, can turn these resources into a real competitive
advantage (Sirmon et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2011). As argued
before in the context of Saudi Arabia's oil embargo, without the
ability to extract the focal resources, the advantage an organiza-
tion (or country) can obtain is limited. In the context of rare earths
this ability to process REEs almost exclusively belongs to China Inc.
As such, it is clear that the ROW at the moment has very limited
power. It has no control over resources, nor does it have the
technological ability to ‘produce’ them, which was explicitly
recognized by the USGS at the closure of Mountain Pass (Haxel
et al., 2002). The local Chinese governments in the REE regions on
the contrary have very high power. Their proximity to the resource
and their status as enforcers of policy enables them to exercise
control. Additionally, they possess the innovative ability to actually
transform the ores into valuable resources. Beijing's power stems
from its ability to shape and form policy and from its status as an
‘enforcer of the enforcers’ in that it has the power to exert control
over local governments (Gobel and Ong, 2012). Additionally, the
long term investments in REE knowledge epitomized by the
opening of two state laboratories for advancements in rare earth
production and extraction methods in the 1990s prove that a great
amount of knowledge is centrally controlled (Hurst, 2010). More-
over, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, a geologist who studied REEs at
graduate school, has said himself that little happens on REE policy
without his explicit involvement (Bradsher, 2011a). It is therefore
safe to say that a relationship of mutual dependence exists
between local and central governments (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Research into organizations has shown that such relationships are
drivers of mergers and other means of constraint absorption
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), a tendency found in China Inc. as
well, as exempliﬁed by the foundation of three overarching State-
Owned Enterprises. Finally, the local community is not yet a
powerful actor but is becoming empowered. Changes in Chinese
repressive policies, together with increasing wealth and better
connectedness to the outside world and to each other thanks to
revolutions in ICT have created a more powerful civil society
(Gobel and Ong, 2012). This power is exempliﬁed by the occasional
success story of how public protests lead to policy changes, such as
in Qiugang, where a small village triumphed and shut down
multiple chemical factories that had been polluting their water
sources (Gobel and Ong, 2012). It is important to realize the
implications of this assessment, as we have suggested that in the
Table 5
Power, legitimacy and urgency of China Inc.'s stakeholders.
Stakeholders
—attributes
ROW Local governments Beijing Local community
Power No REE control—Lack of production
capacity
Proximity and control—Local
enforcement—Innovative Capacity
Policy shaping—National enforcement of
local authorities—Knowledge
ICT—Growing wealth—
Shifts in policy
Legitimacy Resource preservation—Polluter
pays—WTO infringements
Implied in ofﬁcial status—Locally
affected (harm)—Risk-bearing (jobs)
Implied in ofﬁcial status—Not challenged by
civil society—Non-democratic?
Locally affected—Cancer
villages, black lung
Urgency High-tech and clean tech—Shape
public opinion—Large size
Environmental and social issues—Social
unrest
International and National pressure—LT
planning
ICT—Success stories—
Critical to health
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relationships between China Inc. and its four focal stakeholders,
the ROW is the least powerful. This is obviously not an assessment
of the absolute power of the ROW but merely of relationship-
speciﬁc strength. By moving ‘outside the box’, the ROW can
increase its power, as we will discuss in the following section.
Legitimacy in a stakeholder context is construed as a legal
or a moral right, often embedded in a contract (Carroll, 1991).
Additionally, legitimacy can be obtained by those who are risk-
bearing or who are harmed by the actions of the focal organization
(Mitchell et al., 1997). When it comes to contracts, the ROW clearly
does not have a legitimate claim against China Inc., because no
contract exists that requires a country to export its resources.
At best, there are agreed upon principals of free trade, embedded
in theWTO, which could be understood as ‘moral contracts’. This free
trade argument is often made against the export quotas and the two-
tiered pricing structure. While the former could bear some support
from a legitimacy perspective, the price difference argument can at
least partially be countered by the incorporation of externalities
caused by the production of REEs (Kox, 1991). Moreover, the internal
price increases for dysprosium and neodymium, two of the most
demanded REEs, have followed the price changes abroad (see Fig. 3)
and overall, the rare earth price increases between 2000 and 2010
remain below those of gold, copper and iron ore (IOSC, 2012).
Furthermore, one can question the legitimacy of many ROW coun-
tries themselves when it comes to abiding by free trade rules.
Currently, the USA has 17 running disputes with the EU, while the
EU has sued the USA 32 times (Zaring, 2012). Extensive research
exists on the inﬂuence of European “Common Agricultural Policy”
and export subsidies more generally on developing nations (e.g. Diao
et al., 2001; Elbehri and Leetmaa, 2001; Herzfeld, 2005). Besides the
legal arguments against the legitimacy of the ROW (with perhaps the
notable exception of Japan that is less often a respondent of WTO
claims (Moris, 2011)), there is an important fairness argument. Given
that the ROW closed (most of) its mines and thus outsourced the
mining, and the accompanying pollution and social ills to China Inc.
(BGS, 2011), it can hardly claim any legitimate right to the fruits of
that labor. On the other hand, the local governments and Beijing share
a legitimate ofﬁcial status and legal recognition as functionaries of
China Inc. Additionally, from a risk- or harm-based perspective, both
local governments and communities are facing severe health risks, as
shown in examples given previously concerning cancer villages,
black lung and poisoned water (Gobel and Ong, 2012; Hurst, 2010;
Jiabao and Jie, 2009; Lee, 2010). Importantly, the Communist Party's
self-conception is changing and ideological control is making way for
rules and laws inspired on international standards (Naisbitt and
Naisbitt, 2010). This evolution might partially explain why—despite
the questionable democratic nature of the Beijing government—the
increasing protests by the civil society are generally not directed at
the central government and thus not a threat to its legitimacy (Gobel
and Ong, 2012). This perhaps reﬂects the Chinese belief in perfor-
mance legitimacy: “If the government governs well, it is perceived as
legitimate” (Zhang Wei-Wei in Naisbitt and Naisbitt, 2010). In
general, local governments face more personal risk than the central
government as they are more commonly blamed for and ﬁred over
not meeting targets imposed by Beijing (Gobel and Ong, 2012). Fig. 5
Urgency is understood as time sensitivity and criticality to the
focal stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997). Moreover, it is reinforced by
the attention-getting capacity of the claimant. The attention-based
view has advocated that the limited processing capacity and
bounded rationality of the top management, in combination with
imperfect procedures and communication channels, limit managers'
ability to pay attention to all possible issues (Ocasio, 1997). This
limited attention determines which issues are perceived and how
they are interpreted (Daft and Weick, 1984), which in turn drives the
occurrence of organizational moves that shape the environment
(Ocasio, 1997). Within this framework, the ROW clearly has high
urgency. Firstly, there is the notion of size. Given that the ROW is an
incredibly large external stakeholder; its demands have a size-driven
urgency. This is directly mediated by the ROW's capacity to shape the
public opinion, at least within its boundaries, and frame the debate.
The conﬂicting perspectives described in this paper serve as anec-
dotal evidence. Furthermore, many organizations are directly depen-
dent on speciﬁc REEs that are deﬁned as critical (COM, 2008) and this
dependence is time-sensitive in that production targets and market
demand require a timely response. The urgency of the civil society is,
similar to their legitimacy, largely based on the threat they face from
the environmental degradation, but constrained by their limited
voice. This time-sensitive and critical issue is one of the key drivers of
social unrest, which directly affects the urgency of the local govern-
ments that need to maintain social harmony. While the environment
as a stakeholder in its own right has been supported from a fairness
or ethical perspective (Orts and Strudler, 2002; Phillips and Reichart,
2000), it is clear from Beijing's perspective and actions that over-
exploitation of resources in combination with the risks this imposes
on the triple bottom line are key policy drivers (China Daily, 2012;
IOSC, 2012). Finally, the central government faces very high urgency as
well. As the focal opponent of the ROW, it has to balance the
demands from an increasingly urgent stakeholder with the goals of
its own economic and social welfare, its growth ambition and the
constraints imposed by the urgent needs of the civil society and the
limited carrying capacity of the local ecosystems.
Our conceptualization of the four focal stakeholders of China Inc.
along the dimensions of power, legitimacy and urgency has shown
that Beijing is a deﬁnitive stakeholder of China Inc. It scores high on
the three focal attributes, which is probably not surprising as the
central government is the key decision maker. Besides, the local
governments should be seen as dominant stakeholders as they have
high power and high legitimacy (moreover both are intrinsically
intertwined with the central government) but somewhat lower
urgency, especially when likened to the local communities who
have high urgency and high legitimacy but still relatively low
power. In the framework of Mitchell et al. (1997), local communities
are dependent stakeholders who should try to link up with more
Fig. 6. China's dominant position in the REE production process.
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powerful actors to increase their salience. The ROW manifests itself
as a demanding stakeholder, one with high urgency, but limited
power and legitimacy. Mitchell et al. (1997) describe such stake-
holders as “mosquitoes buzzing in the ears of managers: irksome
but not dangerous”. While this outcome is undoubtedly too strong a
statement, it entails a valuable insight. From a stakeholder perspec-
tive, China Inc.'s strategies are justiﬁable as they primarily meet the
demands of stakeholders with higher salience.
6. Changing the stakeholder dynamics in the ROW
The insight that the ROW has low legitimacy and low power
with regards to rare earths provides useful policy clues. In order to
gain greater salience vis-a-vis China Inc., the ROW needs to
increase its power and its legitimacy. Given that the low legitimacy
is based on the absence of formal contracts, the outsourced
environmental damage and the inconsistent argumentation
around free trade, the ROW could tackle any of these issues. The
most promising avenues seem to be increasing the alternative
supply through the opening of mines in the ROW and developing
clean processing techniques. Both are probably rather long term
objectives as the opening of mines and the development of these
novel techniques are time-consuming processes (Chan and Lan,
2011; Kidela Capital Group, 2010). Firstly, the legal hoops to jump
through, the required environmental assessments and the needed
infrastructure often take many years to complete. The Australian
Mount Weld for instance still lacks the necessary infrastructure
and permits to begin mining, separation, and transportation
(Morrison and Tang, 2012). Nonetheless, increasing supply
through streamlined yet stringent legal channels and accepting a
part of the environmental burden that comes with such invest-
ments is fundamental to increasing legitimacy. Secondly, the
development of new techniques is to a certain extent predicated
on the ability to pilot them in actual contexts. Given that China Inc.
made the development of rare earth resources a top priority since
the 1980s, their 30 year head start will not easily be overcome
(Morrison and Tang, 2012). However, the main players within the
ROW, especially the USA, Japan and the EU still have a joint
innovative output per capita (as measured by patent applications)
that strongly exceeds the Chinese total (Khan et al., 2011). There is
no real reason to assume they could not turn this innovative ability
towards rare earth processing techniques.
From the power perspective, we have argued that the ROW is
weak due to its lack of control over any resources and due to its lack
of knowledge and capabilities needed to exploit REEs. As said before,
even if mines outside China would be operational, the reﬁning from
rare earth oxides to metals would have to be done by China Inc.
Improving technological capabilities will thus strengthen the power
within the dyad, as well as increase legitimacy. The more direct
approach that could shift the power dynamics lies within the
stakeholder framework and in the resource dependence theory.
Power is understood as a characteristic of the speciﬁc relationship
between the focal actors (Emerson, 1962). Given that in the short
term, power within the dyad can hardly be shifted, strategies and
policies that move outside the dyad carry signiﬁcant potential.
Although most research on the resource dependence theory (RDT)
has been limited to the solutions deﬁned by Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) which chieﬂy consist of alternatives within the dependent
relationship (Hillman et al., 2009), the options to seek advantage
beyond the troubled relationship and beyond the typical RDT
solutions have been suggested elsewhere (Schillebeeckx and
George, forthcoming). However, even beyond the dyad, one cannot
deny that the overarching trade deﬁcit most countries, especially the
USA, have with China, adds to their power-deﬁciency. As argued by
Fishman (2005), the economic clout a country holds over China,
diminishes the more China is able to clone vital parts of that
country's economy. One of the most promising avenues to balance
the ROW's relative power deﬁcit is through technology exchange or
countertrade. Germany and Kazakhstan for instance made a deal to
exchange the right to search and mine rare earths in Kazakhstan for
technological investments worth nearly $4 billion (Eddy, 2012). This
is not an isolated event. Japan exchanged nuclear technology with
Vietnam, India and Kazakhstan to get access to mineable rare earth
resources, while South Korea is forging similar agreements with
other resource-rich nations (Ernst & Young, 2011; Hirokawa, 2011;
Miyazaki, 2012). These technology exchanges can be understood as
countertrade arrangements in which the resource owner offers
access to resources and imposes reciprocal commitments (Hennart,
1989, 1990). The commitments typically occur in the form of inter-
temporal buy-back where the technology owner provides the
necessary resources to construct the plant and is paid from the
output once the plant is operational. As is the case for REEs, the
quality of output is generally difﬁcult to judge ex ante and the costs
of foreign ownership are high (Mirus and Yeung, 1986). Choi et al.
(1999) argue that such arrangements are rational when measure-
ment and enforcement costs are uncertain and both parties have
distinct and uncertain identities, which occurs frequently when
dealing with emerging economies. The fact that such countertrade
imposes the risk that the focal country clones the technological
knowledge, perhaps explains why we see it more with developing
countries and less with China Inc. as a partner.
A third option for the ROW is to decrease its urgency. Once more,
increasing supply is a way of doing this, as is increasing investments in
substitution, resource-efﬁciency and recycling. In some cases direct
substitution seems to be impossible as is the case for europium in
liquid crystal displays. Sometimes substitution decreases product
efﬁciency and is therefore not economical and more often than not
the best substitute is another REE (Haxel et al., 2002; Lusty and
Walters, 2010). In rare events, substitution can lead to savings thereby
improving competitiveness (Currie, 2012) but this is generally pre-
dicated on a novel technology and design, rather than a straightfor-
ward substitution. A risk here is that regional resource constraints
might imbue conﬂicting or competing technological trajectories
in which valuable human and natural resources are wasted
(Schillebeeckx and George, forthcoming). While recycling technology
is likely to improve in the future, relatively little attention has been
paid so far to the concept of urban mining rare earth metals due to the
technological difﬁculty of breaking down very stable compounds, the
often small quantities used in products, and the second law of
thermodynamics (Lusty and Walters, 2010; UNEP, 2011). Honda has
made progress in “the ﬁrst mass-production rare earth recycling
process” (Currie, 2012), and progress on alternative materials for
permanent magnets is being made (e.g. Bourzac, 2011), but more
needs to be done to balance the dynamics in the REE space again.
7. Conclusion
This article has provided an overview of the different perspec-
tives China and the rest of the world hold when it comes to the
former's rare earth policies. While the ROW seems to perceive
China as a resource nationalist that imposes output quota and
exploits price differences between domestic and international
market to attract foreign direct investments—needed to overcome
its lack of innovative capacity—in its REE regions, the Chinese
discourse seems to differ radically. China's 12th Five Year Plan
signaled the intention to “shift from a policy of maximizing
growth to balancing growth with social harmony and environ-
mental sustainability” (Hannon et al., 2011), an active acknowl-
edgment of its triple bottom line obligations to its various
stakeholders. We ﬁnd that the ROW largely ignores the
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importance of the social and environmental issues and that the
persistent perspectives about China Inc.'s lack of innovative
capacity are at least partially incorrect when it comes to REEs.
Moreover, China's growing internal demand, its supportive inter-
nal policy environment and its trial and error market as well as its
knowledge networks around REE are other essential drivers for
corporate FDI. In the context of social unrest, it has been argued
that the EU (and other governments) need “to devote more
resources to studying the interactions between China's domestic
policy and foreign policy” (Gobel and Ong, 2012, 17). We believe
this statement has broader application than merely with regards
to public protests. The interplay and power plays between the
central authorities and the local governments regarding multiple
industries and the rare earth industry in particular seem to be
poorly understood. However, for policy formation and reactions to
decisions of China Inc.'s strategies, it is important to recognize
these in order to avoid a straw man perspective in which China is
depicted as the bogeyman. As argued by Fishman “[t]he rest of the
world will proﬁt little by demonizing the Chinese, but might ﬁnd
powerful answers in studying and admiring, even grudgingly, the
country's growing strengths” (2005). We suggested that the open-
ing of new mines will serve a triple goal through diminishing
urgency, raising power and raising legitimacy. Moreover, we
argued in favor of countertrade, either with other nations or
directly with China Inc. to ease short-term constraints. Impor-
tantly, the ROW needs to recognize China's genuine environmental
and social concerns that rose as a consequence of overexploitation
of natural resources and public protests. It should not be hard for a
Western government to understand the importance of social
harmony within their own boundaries. So why would it be any
different for the Communist Party?
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